Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth? Evidence from Market-Oriented and Blockholder-Based Governance Regimes
We investigate the impact of corporate governance and product market competition on productivity of German and U.K. firms. We find a strong positive relation between productivity and product market competition and various governance mechanisms. In poorly performing U.K. firms, the presence of strong outside blockholders leads to substantial increases in productivity. In contrast, for poorly performing and distressed German firms, it is bank debt concentration that stimulates productivity growth. Whereas high bank debt concentration also supports productivity growth in profitable German firms, leverage is unrelated to productivity growth in U.K. firms. Weak product market competition in the United Kingdom has a negative impact on productivity growth in both widely held and concentrated firms, with the exception of firms controlled by insiders. For profitable German firms, only control by banks, insurance firms, and the government can somewhat reduce the negative effect of weak product market competition.
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Koke, Jens ; Renneboog, Luc |
Published in: |
Journal of Law and Economics. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 48.2005, 2, p. 475-516
|
Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
The market for corporate control in a bank-based economy: a governance device?
Koke, Jens, (2004)
-
Januszewski, Silke I., (2002)
-
Determinants of acquisition and failure: evidence from corporate Germany
Koke, Jens, (2002)
- More ...