Corporate criminal liability and optimal firm behavior : internal monitoring versus managerial incentives
Year of publication: |
April 2018
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Authors: | Polidori, Paolo ; Teobaldelli, Désirée |
Published in: |
European journal of law and economics. - New York, NY : Springer Science + Business Media, ISSN 0929-1261, ZDB-ID 1231592-8. - Vol. 45.2018, 2, p. 251-284
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Subject: | Compliance | Corporate governance | Deterrence | Law enforcement | Regulation | Corporate Governance | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Theorie | Theory | Normbefolgung | Legal compliance | Haftung | Liability | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Wirtschaftskriminalität | Economic crime | Gesellschaftsrecht | Corporate law |
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