Corporate design for regulability : a principal-agent-supervisor model
Year of publication: |
2006
|
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Authors: | Engel, Christoph |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 162.2006, 1, p. 104-124
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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