Corporate Diversification: What Gets Discounted?
Prior literature finds that diversified firms sell at a discount relative to the sum of the imputed values of their business segments. We explore this documented discount and argue that it stems from risk-reducing effects of corporate diversification. Consistent with this risk-reduction hypothesis, we find that (a) shareholder losses in diversification are a function of firm leverage, (b) all equity firms do not exhibit a diversification discount, and (c) using book values of debt to compute excess value creates a downward bias for diversified firms. Overall, the results indicate that diversification is insignificantly related to excess firm value. Copyright The American Finance Association 2002.
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Mansi, Sattar A. ; Reeb, David M. |
Published in: |
Journal of Finance. - American Finance Association - AFA, ISSN 1540-6261. - Vol. 57.2002, 5, p. 2167-2183
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Publisher: |
American Finance Association - AFA |
Saved in:
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