Correlated Equilibria in Homogenous Good Bertrand Competition

We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods.This provides a theoretical underpinning for the so-called "Bertrand paradox" and also generalizes earlier results on mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. Our proof generalizes to asymmetric marginal costs and arbitrarily many players

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Jann, Ole
Other Persons:	Schottmüller, Christoph (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Preiswettbewerb \| Price competition \| Korrelation \| Correlation

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 30, 2014 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2483070 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048838