Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Bloch, Francis ; Dutta, Bhaskar |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 66.2009, 2, p. 721-728
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Correlated equilibrium Coalitions Information sharing Games with positive externalities |
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