Correlates of crisis induced credit market discipline : the roles of democracy, veto players, and government turnover
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Amri, Puspa Delima ; Chiu, Eric M. P. ; Meyer, Jacob M. ; Richey, Greg M. ; Willett, Thomas D. |
Published in: |
Open economies review. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, ISSN 1573-708X, ZDB-ID 1478937-1. - Vol. 33.2022, 1, p. 61-87
|
Subject: | Financial crises | Credit growth | Political institutions | Discipline | Economic reforms | Policy learning | Finanzkrise | Financial crisis | Welt | World | Bankenaufsicht | Banking supervision | Demokratie | Democracy | Kreditmarkt | Credit market | Wirtschaftsreform | Economic reform | Veto | Finanzmarkt | Financial market |
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