Corruption in the public organizations. Towards a model of cost-benefit analysis for the anticorruption strategies

The paper aims to evaluate how the anticorruption strategies lead to minimizing the corruption phenomenon in the public organizations, with special reference to those from public administration and health system in Romania. Based on some essential features, stated by Banfield (1975) about the capacity of the public organizations to minimize corruption inside the organizations, the authors achieved two parallel sociological researches in the public administration system and the health system in Romania. Thus, the researches reveal a paradox in the finality of the mentioned public organizations between the exclusive preoccupation for an ethical behaviour and the other objectives of the organizations: effectiveness, flexibility, dynamics etc. In the context of very interesting studies, such as those by Rose-Ackerman (1975, 2005), the premises of research are based on the idea that “the anticorruption strategies should orient, firstly towards improvement of the economic, technical and operational efficiency” of the public organization. Therefore, we may speak about “optimal” level of corruption rather than “zero” level. We justify this fact through the costs of supporting the anticorruption strategies, their direct impact on organizational effectiveness and performance.