Corruption, public finances, and the unofficial economy

Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatán

In this sample of 49 Latin America, OECD, and transition economies, it is the ineffective and discretionary administration of tax and regulatory regimes--not higher tax rates alone--as well as corruption, that increases the size of the unofficial economy. And countries with a large unofficial economy tend to grow more slowly

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Year of publication:	[1999]
Authors:	Johnson, Simon
Other Persons:	Kaufmann, Daniel (contributor) ; Zoido-Lobatán, Pablo (contributor)
Institutions:	World Bank Institute / Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division (contributor)
Publisher:	Washington, DC : World Bank, World Bank Institute, Governance, Regulation, and Finance
Subject:	Korruption \| Corruption \| Schattenwirtschaft \| Underground economy \| Öffentliche Finanzen \| Public finance \| Steuerbelastung \| Tax burden \| Systemtransformation \| Economic transition \| Öffentlicher Haushalt \| Public budget \| Theorie \| Theory \| Regulierung \| Regulation \| Lateinamerika \| Latin America \| OECD-Staaten \| OECD countries

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (50 p) ill 28 cm
Series:	Policy research working paper ; 2169
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	"August 1999"--Cover Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-31) Also available in print.
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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