Corruption under moral hazard

Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele

Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits

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Year of publication:	[1999]
Authors:	Eskeland, Gunnar S.
Other Persons:	Thiele, Henrik (contributor)
Institutions:	World Bank / Development Research Group / Public Economics (contributor)
Publisher:	Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics
Subject:	Korruption \| Corruption \| Theorie \| Theory \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (39 p) ill 28 cm
Series:	Policy research working paper ; 2204
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	"October 1999"--Cover Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39) Also available in print.
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010524634