Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly
This paper revisits the conventional doctrine that "it is easier to collude among equals", applied in the context of vertically related markets. In a differentiated duopoly model, we study how cost-based access price regulation may hinder the sustainability of tacit collusion.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Baranes, Edmond ; Poudou, Jean-Christophe |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 106.2010, 3, p. 172-176
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Collusion Access Regulation Vertical structure |
Saved in:
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