Costly information acquisition and delegation to a "liberal" central banker
Year of publication: |
2001
|
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Authors: | Lagerlöf, Johan |
Published in: |
Economics & politics. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0954-1985, ZDB-ID 1002943-6. - Vol. 13.2001, 3, p. 221-236
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Zentralbank | Central bank | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Kosten | Costs | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Theorie | Theory |
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