Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?

This paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition. It proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heterogeneous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation. Inefficiencies can be partially corrected by limiting participation to the most competent citizens, a result which provides a rational foundation for epistocratic government.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Triossi, Matteo
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 82.2013, C, p. 169-191
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Endogenous information acquisition \| Heterogeneity \| Condorcetʼs Jury Theorem

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049772