Costly network formation and regular equilibria
We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur a strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | De Sinopoli, Francesco ; Pimienta, Carlos |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 69.2010, 2, p. 492-497
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Network-formation games Regular equilibrium Stable sets |
Saved in:
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