Costly voting when both information and preferences differ : is turnout too high or too low?
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Ghosal, Sayantan ; Lockwood, Ben |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 33.2009, 1, p. 25-50
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Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Theorie | Theory |
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