Could making banks hold only liquid assets induce bank runs?
Restrictions placed on bank portfolios are analyzed in a banking model designed to capture the role of checking accounts in facilitating transactions. Forcing banks to hold only liquid assets creates the incentive for liquidity-based runs. Even when a run does not occur, welfare is reduced as a result of overinvestment in the liquid asset.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Peck, James ; Shell, Karl |
Published in: |
Journal of Monetary Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-3932. - Vol. 57.2010, 4, p. 420-427
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Bank runs Bank stability Deposit contracts Glass-Steagall banking Mechanism design Portfolio restrictions Sunspot equilibrium |
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