Credibility, ambiguity and asymmetric information with wage-price stickiness
Year of publication: |
1990
|
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Authors: | Levine, Paul ; Pearlman, Joseph |
Institutions: | Centre for economic policy research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
London : [s.n.] |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty |
Extent: | 45 S |
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Series: | Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research. - London, ISSN 0265-8003, ZDB-ID 1442064-8. - Vol. 409 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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