Credibility and Commitment of Monetary Policy in Open Economies
Year of publication: |
2000-09-01
|
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Authors: | D'Amato, Marcello ; Martina, Riccardo |
Institutions: | Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) |
Subject: | monetary policy delegation | central bankers | private information | strategic interaction |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Published in European Journal of Political Economy, 2003, vol. 21, pages 872-902 |
Classification: | E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission |
Source: |
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