Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Eső, Péter ; Schummer, James |
Publisher: |
Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |
Subject: | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Signalling | Spieltheorie | Theorie | Signaling games | Sender-Receiver | robust equilibrium | refinements. |
Series: | Discussion Paper ; 1406 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 587316403 [GVK] hdl:10419/31230 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1406 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Source: |
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