Credit rating agencies and elections in emerging democracies: Guardians of fiscal discipline?

Analyses of budget balances in 18 emerging presidential democracies observed prior to the financial crisis of 2008–2009 show that credit rating agencies induce fiscal discipline in election years, thus reducing incentives for governments to borrow opportunistically for short-term electoral gain.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Hanusch, Marek ; Vaaler, Paul M.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 119.2013, 3, p. 251-254
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Credit rating agencies \| Elections \| Fiscal policy \| Political budget cycle

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	F30 - International Finance. General ; F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems ; G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage ; H63 - Debt; Debt Management ; O10 - Economic Development. General ; O23 - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664115