Crowding games are sequentially solvable
Year of publication: |
1998-12-16
|
---|---|
Authors: | Milchtaich, Igal |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 27.1998, 4, p. 501-509
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Crowding games | congestion games | sequential solvability | pure-strategy equilibria |
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