Curbing agency problems in the procurement process by protest oversight
Year of publication: |
1994
|
---|---|
Authors: | Marshall, Robert C. |
Other Persons: | Meurer, Michael J. (contributor) ; Richard, Jean-François (contributor) |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 25.1994, 2, p. 297-318
|
Subject: | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States |
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