DANGO: JAPAN'S PRICE-FIXING CONSPIRACIES
This paper addresses two questions about collusion in the Japanese construction industry. First, what mechanisms are used for enforcing the collusive agreement, for dividing the spoils, and for preventing the entry of new firms seeking a share of the collusive profits? Second, how much are prices raised as a result of the collusion? Copyright 1991 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
Year of publication: |
1991
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Authors: | McMillan, John |
Published in: |
Economics and Politics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 3.1991, 3, p. 201-218
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
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