Das institutionenökonomisch-evolutionäre Wettbewerbsleitbild

I propose in this paper principles for antitrust analysis that are drwan from theoretical developments in New Institutional Economics and Evolutinary Economics. In order to provide a guide to antitrust regulation one needs two building blocks, the scientific results on the nature of the competitive process and a conception of how to deal with normative issues. To start with, I show that competition is best theroetically analyzed as an evolutionary process unfolding within legal rules. I proceed with showing the shortcomings of the dominant paradigms dealing with normative issues in economics, i.e. of welfare economics and constitutional economics and with suggesting the principle of critical examination as an alternative. The institutional evolutionary guide for antitrust regulation is sketched then building on these blocks and I plead for a rule-governed antitrust policy which mainly operates with per se rules that are formulated in a negative way.