Dead and Gone
I argue that desire satisfaction theories of welfare are not committed to the view that changes in welfare levels can happen after death, or that events that occur after death impact the agent's welfare levels now. My argument is that events that occur after death have only epistemological import. They may reveal that the person was successful (unsuccessful) in life, but the desire was already frustrated or satisfied before the person died. The virtue of the account is that it gives us a way to acknowledge both the intuition that we cannot be harmed after we die and, in a sense, the intuition that things that happen after we die are relevant to our lives.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | JENKINS, JOYCE L. |
Published in: |
Utilitas. - Cambridge University Press. - Vol. 23.2011, 02, p. 228-234
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Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
Description of contents: | Abstract [journals.cambridge.org] |
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