Deadlines and infrequent monitoring in the dynamic provision of public goods
Year of publication: |
August 2017
|
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Authors: | Georgiadis, George |
Published in: |
Journal of public economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727, ZDB-ID 183995-0. - Vol. 152.2017, p. 1-12
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Subject: | Public goods | Free riding | Frontloading | Deadlines | Infrequent monitoring | Theorie | Theory | Öffentliche Güter | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | Free rider problem |
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