Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management.
The authors argue that long-term debt has a role in controlling management's ability to finance future investments. Companies with high (widely held) debt will find it hard to raise capital, since new security-holders will have low priority relative to existing creditors; conversely for companies with low debt. The authors show that there is an optimal debt-equity ratio and mix of senior and junior debt if management undertakes unprofitable as well as profitable investments. They derive conditions under which equity and a single class of senior long-term debt work as well as more complex contracts for controlling investment behavior. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Hart, Oliver ; Moore, John |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 85.1995, 3, p. 567-85
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
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