Debt crises between a country and an international lender as a two-period game
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hausken, Kjell ; Welburn, Jonathan William |
Published in: |
International review of economics & finance : IREF. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1059-0560, ZDB-ID 2026509-8. - Vol. 92.2024, p. 704-723
|
Subject: | Borrow | Consumption | Country | Debt | Default | ECB | Economic risk | EU | Game theory | Greece | IMF | Loan | Sensitivity analysis | Spieltheorie | Griechenland | Internationale Staatsschulden | International sovereign debt | Schuldenmanagement | Debt management | Kreditrisiko | Credit risk | Öffentliche Schulden | Public debt | Internationaler Kredit | International credit | Kredit | Credit | Länderrisiko | Country risk |
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