Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare
Year of publication: |
2005-03
|
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Authors: | Hindriks, Jean ; Lockwood, Ben |
Institutions: | James W. Martin School of Public Policy and Administration, University of Kentucky |
Subject: | fiscal federalism | decentralization | elections | accountability |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 2006-02 37 pages |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; H41 - Public Goods ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism |
Source: |
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Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation and Vote Welfare
Jean, HINDRIKS, (2005)
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Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare
HINDRIKS, Jean, (2005)
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Institutional Model of Decentralization in Action
Azis, Iwan J., (2012)
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Centralization and political accountability
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Political Budget Cycles and Fiscal Decentralization
González, Paula, (2006)
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Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare
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