Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Dreher, Axel ; Fischer, Justina A. V.
Publisher:	Zurich : ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute
Subject:	Politische Gewalt \| International \| Dezentralisierung \| Verwaltungsstandort \| Politische Entscheidung \| Panel \| Welt \| Terrorism \| Decentralization \| Democracy

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Series:	KOF Working Papers ; 185
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3929/ethz-a-005510833 [DOI] 583342493 [GVK] hdl:10419/50349 [Handle]
Classification:	D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; H70 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations. General ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277739