Decentralized fiscal federalism revisited: Optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership

This paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where one lower level government is the first mover also in the horizontal dimension. Under plausible assumptions, horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized leadership.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Aronsson, Thomas ; Persson, Lars
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 117.2012, 1, p. 223-226
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Optimal taxation \| Redistribution \| Public goods \| Fiscal federalism \| Decentralized leadership \| Horizontal leadership

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D31 - Personal Income, Wealth and Their Distributions ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010580445