Decentralized task assignment and centralized contracting : on the optimal allocation of authority
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Reichmann, Steffen ; Rohlfing-Bastian, Anna |
Published in: |
Journal of management accounting research : JMAR. - Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., ISSN 1049-2127, ZDB-ID 1101530-5. - Vol. 26.2014, 1, p. 33-55
|
Subject: | task assignment | incentives | decision right | authority | organizational structure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Organisationsstruktur | Organizational structure | Theorie | Theory | Dezentralisierung | Decentralization | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Anforderungsprofil | Occupational profile | Allokation | Allocation | Dezentrale Organisation | Decentralized organization | Anreiz | Incentives | Entscheidung | Decision | Autorität | Authority | Unternehmensorganisation | Business organization |
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