Decentralizing aid with interested parties

Gil S. Epstein; Ira N. Gang

This paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap. -- Foreign aid ; rent seeking ; governance ; decentralization

MoreLess

Year of publication:	31 July 2006
Other Persons:	Epstein, Gil S. (contributor) ; Gang, Ira N. (contributor)
Publisher:	New Brunswick, NJ : Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey
Subject:	Entwicklungshilfe \| Development aid \| Dezentralisierung \| Decentralization \| Rent-Seeking \| Rent seeking \| Politische Entscheidung \| Political decision \| Good Governance \| Good governance \| Theorie \| Theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	Online-Ressource, 16 S., Text
Series:	Working papers / Rutgers University, Department of Economics. - New Brunswick, NJ : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2172035-6. - Vol. 2006,29
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/31263 [Handle]
Classification:	O10 - Economic Development. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003698569