Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Amorós, Pablo ; Martínez, Ricardo ; Moreno, Bernardo ; Puy, M. Socorro |
Published in: |
SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1869-4195, ZDB-ID 2536381-5. - Vol. 3.2012, 1/2, p. 1-14
|
Subject: | Wahlsystem | Electoral system | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Systemvoraussetzung Acrobat Reader |
Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s13209-011-0039-6 [DOI] hdl:10419/77739 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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