Decision costs and the strategic design of administrative process and judicial review
Year of publication: |
1997
|
---|---|
Authors: | Spiller, Pablo T. |
Other Persons: | Tiller, Emerson H. (contributor) |
Published in: |
The journal of legal studies. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 0047-2530, ZDB-ID 183993-7. - Vol. 26.1997, 2, p. 347-370
|
Subject: | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law | Gerichtliche Prozesskosten | Litigation costs | Rechtspolitik | Legal policy | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory |
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