Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt

We analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows, rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract -- specifically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment -- under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal. In the second part we consider a more general class of (non-debt) contracts, and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1997-01
Authors:	Hart, Oliver D. ; Moore, John
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	NBER Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	CF published as Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, no. 1 (1998): 1-41. Number 5907
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005580689