Deferred Acceptance with Incomplete Information

This paper studies a matching algorithm which is termed incomplete-information deferred acceptance (DA). We show that DA is finite and that it produces a stable market state. We also compare DA with algorithms in the literature, including the complete-information Gale-Shapley algorithm, the Roth-Vande Vate algorithm and learning-blocking paths

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Year of publication:	[2022]
Authors:	Chen, Yi-Chun ; Hu, Gaoji
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (20 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 3, 2022 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4024839 [DOI]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013306085