Defying the 'Juncker Curse’: Can Reformist Governments Be Re-elected?
Year of publication: |
2008-06
|
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Authors: | Biroli, Pietro ; Buti, Marco ; Turrini, Alessandro Antonio ; Van Den Noord, Paul |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | Economic and Monetary Union | electoral cycle | financial markets | structural reforms |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 6875 |
Classification: | E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; H30 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents. General ; H60 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt. General ; H70 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations. General |
Source: |
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Defying the 'Juncker Curse': Can Reformist Governments Be Re-elected?
Buti, Marco, (2008)
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Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment?
Buti, Marco, (2003)
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Defying the ‘Juncker curse’: can reformist governments be re-elected?
Buti, Marco, (2009)
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Defying the 'juncker curse' : can reformist governments be re-elected?
Buti, Marco, (2008)
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Defying the "Juncker curse" : can reformist governments be re-elected?
Buti, Marco, (2009)
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Reforms and re-elections in OECD countries
Buti, Marco, (2010)
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