Delegated monitoring versus arm's-length contracting
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dequiedt, Vianney ; Martimort, David |
Published in: |
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 875355-6. - Vol. 22.2004, 7, p. 951-981
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmensorganisation | Business organization | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Theorie | Theory |
-
On the pricing of corporate value under information asymmetry
Shibata, Takashi, (2004)
-
Symposium on incentives and organization of the firm
(1997)
-
Gestaltung von Lieferbeziehungen bei Informationsasymmetrie
Schenk-Mathes, Heike Yasmin, (1999)
- More ...
-
Non-manipulable mechanisms : a brief overview
Dequiedt, Vianney, (2007)
-
Vertical contracting with informational opportunism
Dequiedt, Vianney, (2015)
-
Delegated monitoring versus arm's-length contracting
Dequiedt, Vianney, (2004)
- More ...