Delegation and Firms’ Ability to Collude : A Comment

Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) extend Vickers' (1985) Cournot model of strategic delegation to an inﬁnitely repeated setting and conclude that delegation does not aﬀect cartel stability if managers collude. This result rests on the assumption that managers are rational, but owners are not. This note shows that if owners behave fully rational, then delegation improves cartel stability if managers collude

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Han, Martijn A.
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Kartell \| Cartel \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Kooperative Führung \| Participative leadership

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (7 p)
Series:	Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper ; No. 2011-02
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 22, 2010 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1742738 [DOI]
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013131354