Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lei, Haoran ; Zhao, Xiaojian |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 21.2021, 2, p. 637-656
|
Subject: | delegation | unforeseen contingencies | unawareness | financial advice | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Erwartungsnutzen | Expected utility |
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