Delegation and information revelation
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Gautier, Axel ; Paolini, Dimitri |
Publisher: |
Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Signalling | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Vertragstheorie | Asymmetrische Information | Theorie | Incomplete contracts | delegation | signalling game |
Series: | Nota di Lavoro ; 47. 2000 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/155101 [Handle] |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration |
Source: |
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