Delegation and Strategic Compensation in Tournaments

This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric equilibria, however, one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative weight.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2000-12
Authors:	Kräkel, Matthias
Institutions:	University of Bonn, Germany

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Bonn Econ Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	2 pages long
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989622