Delegation, Committees, and Managers
"Attempts to economize on decision-making time imply that groups of peers may delegate authority to a small committee of managers even though this means that the information and preferences of the uninvolved players are neglected. Decisions are more likely to be delegated to players with better information and more representative preferences. The possibility of ex post protests may force managers to take the preferences of others into account but may also give them incentives to ignore their private information. The argument may explain employees' willingness to let bosses decide, and thus throw some light on the theory of the firm." Copyright 2007, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Wernerfelt, Birger |
Published in: |
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 16.2007, 1, p. 35-51
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
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