Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design
In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the …first period and across agents.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Gautier, A. ; Paolini, D. |
Institutions: | Centro Ricerche Nord Sud (CRENoS) |
Saved in:
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