Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem
Year of publication: |
2003-06
|
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Authors: | Driffill, John ; Rotondi, Zeno |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | credibility | delegation | independent central banks | monetary policy | time-inconsistency |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 3923 |
Classification: | E31 - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies ; E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination |
Source: |
-
Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem
Rotondi, Zeno, (2003)
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Himmels, Christoph, (2012)
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The Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates: How Important Is It?
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Driffill, John, (2007)
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Monetary policy and financial stability : what role for the futures market?
Driffill, John, (2006)
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