Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Semenov, Aggey |
Institutions: | Département d'Économie / Department of Economics, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa |
Subject: | energy | Information | bias | non-informed agent | delegation set |
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