Delegation versus centralization : the role of externalities
Year of publication: |
2006
|
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Authors: | Currarini, Sergio ; Feri, Francesco |
Published in: |
Research in economics : an international review of economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1090-9443, ZDB-ID 1379004-3. - Vol. 60.2006, 2, p. 112-119
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Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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