Delegation Versus Centralization: The Role of Externalities
Year of publication: |
2006
|
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Authors: | Currarini, Sergio ; Feri, Francesco |
Institutions: | Dipartimento di Economia, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia |
Subject: | Contracts | Externalities | Centralization | Delegation |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | forthcoming Number 2006_15 15 pages longages |
Classification: | D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Source: |
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Delegation Versus Centralization : The Role of Externalities
Currarini, Sergio, (2012)
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