Democracy, Elite-Bias and Redistribution in LATAM

Do the poor soak the rich under democracy? Although social conflict theory predicts that democracies should be more redistributive than autocracies, a burgeoning literature challenges this contention. This paper draws on these dueling approaches to investigate the relationship between regime type and redistribution. It does so by focusing attention on Latin America, a highly unequal region of the world where we should not only expect redistribution after a democratic transition, but expect a lot of it. I construct a theory that outlines the conditions under which democracies redistribute. I corroborate this theory empirically in Latin America. Elite biased democracies are those in which constitutional engineering by the rich before a transition dampens redistribution. Conversely, democracies that appeal to the median voter, after they adopt their own constitution, tax more, indulge in spending on education, health, housing, welfare, and social insurance, have greater public employment, and are more likely to expropriate fixed assets